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Limitations on Alien Investment
in American Real Estate
Fred L. Morrison*
The changing circumstances of international trade, particularly increased prices for crude petroleum, have caused an unprecedented flow of American dollars into foreign hands. This
phenomenon has inspired domestic concern over the eventual
disposition of these funds: Will aliens, by investment in the
United States, acquire unwarranted influence over her economic,
social, and political life? This concern has produced congressional proposals to restrict alien investment in all types of businesses."
The concern has focused on a variety of enterprises, from
banking to transportation.2 Perhaps because of the essential
historical role played by land acquisition and ownership in the
advancement and democratization of our frontiers, foreign acquisition of land has been a particularly sensitive subject. Alien
purchases of property in the thickly settled areas of Hawaii and
coasts, for instance, have
in the farmlands along the Carolina
3
excited much adverse comment.
The prospect of a return of American dollars to their native
shores in the form of capital investment has not uniformly
inspired mistrust, however. Some have viewed it, without prejuProfessor of Law, University of Minnesota. The author notes
his participation in two research projects that have resulted in more
*

general publications on this topic: F. MoRRIsoN & K. KRAUSE, STATE

AND

FEDERAL LEGAL REGULATION OF ALIEN AND CORPORATE LAND OwNERSHIP
AND FARm OPERATION (U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Agricultural Economic

Report No. 284, 1975) and Morrison, Legal Regulation of Alien Land
Ownership in the United States, in 2 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERIM
REPORT TO CONGRESS

ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

wNTHE

UNITED

STATES app. XI (1975). The views expressed in this Article are solely
those of the author and do not reflect any position of the United States
Government.
1. This is the thrust of a series of bills proposed in Congress over
the past few years. See, e.g., S. 3955, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). They
culminated in legislation establishing an inquiry into foreign investment
that will be completed in May 1976. Foreign Investment Study Act
of 1974, 88 Stat. 1450.
2. E.g., recent concern over Kuwaiti deposits in a large New York
bank and over Iranian loans to Pan American airlines.
3. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1974, § 2, at 32, col. 1.
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dice toward its origins, as a source of potential prosperity. Thus
some states actively encourage foreign investment as well as

trade and maintain offices abroad for that purpose.
Neither suspicion nor encouragement of foreign investment
in the United States is new. On the one hand, Congress once

legislated to exclude the English aristocracy from American land
ownership, 4 and various states did the same with regard to
Orientals. 5 Moreover, state property laws, deriving from a common English heritage, retain varying degrees of the ancient
common-law restrictions on alien land ownership. On the other
hand, as a developing nation the United States depended on
European capital for the development of its industry and trade.
The current ambivalence toward a resurgence of alien investment is a predictable continuation of these dual tendencies.
This Article is concerned with legal restrictions on alien
investment in land. It surveys existing state and federal restrictions and then examines the validity under the federal Constitution and treaties of those laws and of proposals for further
limitations. It concludes with a detailed summary and recommendations for the most effective imeans of implementing further limitations, should they prove necessary.
For a number of reasons the law relating to land ownership
by aliens is different from and considerably more complex than
the law respecting other foreign investments. First, real property law, in contrast to personal property and securities law, rests
on feudal origins. The common law of personal property,
which governed most aspects of trade and commerce, drew no
distinctions on the basis of nationality. Nor do the modem
codifications. The same applies to the law of intangibles. Real
property law, on the other hand, was originally concerned with
maintenance of military loyalty to feudal lords, and thus with the
exclusion of aliens. Second, because it has remained the jealously guarded domain of the states, real property law has been
relatively immune to movements toward uniformity, while personal property law and the law of intangibles have acquired a
substantial national uniformity. Finally, investment in land has
been more stringently regulated than any other form of alien
investment, except for that in the defense, transportation, and
communication industries.
4. See text accompanying notes 19-21 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 25.43 infra.
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I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The present state of law affecting foreign investment in
land is best understood in the light of a brief examination of its
history. History can pull the confusing and sometimes inconsistent provisions of state laws into a comprehensible, although
not a comprehensive, whole. The law of real property in the
United States derives from English feudal law. In that country
the feudal system evolved, after the Norman Conquest, into a
complex hierarchical form of landholding and government. At
the top of a pyramid stood the King, who held title to every foot
of English soil. Beneath him were the lords to whom he or his
predecessors had granted possession of certain lands in return
for an agreement to furnish the King with specified goods or
services, usually including a number of armed knights to serve
him in foreign campaigns. The lord's promise was secured by
an oath of fealty, or loyalty, to the King. These lords in turn
granted land to other men who in turn agreed to provide knights
or other payment, likewise secured by an oath of fealty. Justice
was dispensed by the manorial lords and, ultimately, by the
King. Designed, as it was, to secure allegiance to the crown
through military service, the system obviously could tolerate no
alien landholders, and so they were excluded.
Despite some minor amelioration of this rule-aliens were
later permitted to take real estate by purchase, but not by
inheritance 7-- it remained the law of England until 1870. Eventually, the rule could be avoided by simply using domestic
trustees to hold legal title to the land. The chancery courts,
which were not bound by feudal notions, would normally enforce the equitable interest of the trust beneficiary regardless of
his nationality, and the common-law courts would not look
beyond the trustee's citizenship in determining compliance with
the formal requirements of real property law. Still, the old rule
continued to create problems for the unwary until it was abol8
ished by statute.
Early American land law was based upon this English
heritage. The common-law exclusion of aliens generally prevailed. Indeed, in the colonial era some states apparently re6. For a more thorough exposition of this history, see Sullivan,
Alien Land Laws: A Re-Evaluation, 36 TEmp. L.Q. 15 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as Sullivan].
7.

2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAMES *249-50.

8. Naturalization Act of 1870, 33 &34 Vict., c. 14, § 2.
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stricted land ownership by citizens of other states, a practice
which the Constitution prohibited by the privileges and immunities clause.9 And during and shortly after the American Revolution some states expropriated the holdings of English subjects,
since they had become aliens and, worse yet, enemies.
The
continuing rights of English landowners were recognized by
treaty in 1794.10 The supremacy of the treaty over one of the
expropriation acts was established in 1812, in Fairfax's Devisee
v. Hunter'sLessee."
Since they are state law, American rules restricting alien
land ownership have not developed uniformly. There has, however, been a uniform tendency toward dilution or abolition of
the common-law exclusion of aliens. In part this has been
accomplished through legislation.
Pennsylvania statutes are
illustrative.12 Originally excluding aliens without exception,
they were progressively qualified, first to grant aliens inheritance
rights,' 3 then to permit resident aliens to purchase 500 acres, 14
and finally to permit purchases up to 5000 acres. 15 And in
part the relaxation has been accomplished through judicial interpretation of the common law. Some courts read the English
precedents to hold that an alien did not forfeit his land automatically, but only after the official institution of an inquest ex
officio.' 6 Thus only state officials, not private escheators, could
institute forfeiture proceedings, and their forbearance might be
expected in certain circumstances. Other courts interpreted the
precedents to deal only with the inheritance, not the purchase,
of land, and thus limited the application of the exclusion. 17
9. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. The right to "take, hold and dispose

of property, either real or personal" is included within the scope of this
provision in the formative dictum of Justice Washington in Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
10. The Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation with Great
Britain, Nov. 19, 1794, art. IX, 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105.
11. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 21-32 (1965).
13. Id. § 22 (originally enacted as Supplement of Feb. 23, 1791, Pa.
Laws 1791, ch. MDXVII).
14. Id. § 25 (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 10, 1807, Pa. Laws
1807, ch. XVII).
15. Id. § 28 (originally enacted as Act of March 24, 1818, Pa. Laws
1818, ch. CLVII). A later Pennsylvania statute provides that aliens may
purchase land not exceeding 5000 acres in area and not producing more
than $20,000 in net annual income. Id. § 32 (originally enacted as Supplement of May 1, 1861, Pa. Laws 1861, No. 405).
16. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmIES *293. Sullivan, supra note
6, at 16-17, develops this history well
17. Governeur's Heirs v. Robertson, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 332 (1826);
2 J. KENT, COa1 NTARES *61-63.
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Three major developments within the past century interrupted this liberalizing tendency: the exclusion of extensive
alien land ownership in the frontier territories of the Great
Plains and in several Midwestern states, the exclusion of Orientals from land ownership on the Pacific Coast in the period
between the two world wars, and the exclusion of inheritance ofland by residents of "Iron Curtain" countries. None of these
exceptions is now significant, but they shed light on the present
question.
In the quarter century following the Civil War, Americans
swarmed into the territories of the Great Plains and the Rocky
Mountains to settle. They homesteaded or bought land for
farming and gradually turned these areas into states. However,
these yeoman farmers and ranchers and their shopkeeping brethern were not the only new arrivals. Some foreign investors,
members of the English nobility prominent among them, began
acquiring large ranches. This development engendered a number of fears in the frontier territories.' s Would the foreigners
seek to establish themselves as landlords of the European type?
Would the creation of ranches of such a nature jeopardize the
acquisition of statehood? Was the area in danger of becoming
an economic colony of Great Britain?
The Territorial
Congress responded sympathetically.
Land Act of 1887 forbade extensive alien landholding in the
organized territories, except by immigrant farmers who had
applied for citizenship. 19 Other laws restricted the acquisition
of homesteads or other federal government land by aliens or
alien-controlled businesses. 20 Most of these federal laws are
now of reduced significance, because the territories have been
organized into states, and relatively little homestead land remains. Restrictions on alien acquisition of federal mineral lands
have a continuing importance, however, since much mineral-rich
21
land, including offshore oil resources, is publicly owned.
18. Sullivan, supra note 6, at 30-32.

19. 48 U.S.C. §§ 1501-07 (1970).

20. 43 U.S.C. § 161 (1970), 43 C.F.R. § 2511.1 (1974) (homesteads);
43 U.S.C. § 315 et seq. (1970), 43 C.F.R. §§ 4121.1-1(a) - (c) (1974) (graz-'
ing). Grazing rights are important in some Western areas, since many

ranches are not economically viable if permission to use neighboring federally owned lands is withheld.
21. See Mining Law of 1872, § 1, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1970) (applicable
to "all valuable mineral deposits" but not those containing petroleum
products); Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. (1970)
(applicable to petroleum products and other minerals). Restrictions on
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A group of Midwestern states enacted laws similar to the
Territorial Land Act at about the same time.2 2 These laws
prohibited alien ownership except by immigrant farmers, who
constituted a substantial portion of the population in some of
these states. Eventually a few of the statutes were repealed or
nullified by constitutional amendment in order to foster foreign
investment. 23 In other states, however, the laws remain on the
24
books.
The second wave of anti-alien legislation illustrates one of
the more deplorable aspects of American history, the systematic
discrimination against persons of Oriental ancestry. 20 Land
laws were only part of a pattern. Immigration laws contained
similar provisions. 26 The detention of Japanese and JapaneseAmericans in concentration camps during the Second World
War was the culmination of this discrimination.
Motivated by racial intolerance or by a fear of undue
competition from allegedly overzealous Oriental farmers, legislatures in Pacific Coast states passed laws prohibiting alien Orientals from owning land. California, which had legislatively abolfor landholding,2 7
citizenship
of
condition
ished the
reintroduced it in this modified form in 1913.28 The legislation
spread eastward, finding its way into the statute books of states
29
as far east as Kansas.
These laws were commonly framed to exclude from land
ownership "aliens ineligible for citizenship." Since Orientals
alien ownership also exist in more recent enactments dealing with offshore oil development, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (1970), and with geothermal steam resources. 30 U.S.C. § 1015 (1970).

22. Sullivan, supra note 6, at 31-32. At one time 13 states enacted
legislation prohibiting aliens from acquiring land. U.S. PUBLIC LAND
LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, HISTORY OF PUBLIc LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT

482-83 (1968).
23. For a discussion of individual state statutes, see text accompanying notes 50-121 infra.

24. See Sullivan, supranote 6.
25. See Ferguson, The California Alien Land Law and the Fourteenth Amendment, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 61 (1947); McGovney, The AntiJapanese Land Laws of California and Ten Other States, 35 CALIF. L.
REv. 7 (1947).

26. See note 30 infra.
27. Amendments to the Code of California 1873-74, ch. 612, § 100
(codified at CAL. CIVIL CODE § 671 (1954) ) quoted in Blythe v. Hinckley,
180 U.S. 333, 337 n.1 (1901).
28. Cal. Stats. ch. 113 (1913). The restrictions on alien land ownership were made more severe by an initiative law approved by the voters
in 1920. 1921 Cal. Stats. Ex. Sess. lxxxvii.
29. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-511 (19 ).
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were the only racial class excluded from citizenship by the
federal immigration laws,30 the practical effect was immediate.
Moreover, the statutes themselves were highly detailed, prohibiting not only direct ownership1 of land but also every imaginable
3
form of avoidance technique.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the validity of
these laws in 1923.32 Finding nothing to offend the equal
protection clause,33 the Court based its decision on the power of
a state to define and delimit property rights. 34
The demise of this body of legislation began with a Supreme Court decision invalidating a California statutory provision creating a presumption that land acquired by a citizen from
funds provided by an ineligible alien was acquired on behalf of
the alien in violation of the statute and thus subject to forfeiture.
The Court held the presumption to be discriminatory and violative of a minor Oriental's right, as a citizen by birth, to own land
anywhere in the United States. 35 Four concurring Justices asserted that the basic legislation prohibiting alien ownership
might also be susceptible to challenge. 3 6
PerThat challenge never reached the Supreme Court. 37
haps motivated by the Court's new stance, perhaps by the record
of racial atrocities that emerged from World War II, the states
with legislation discriminating against landholding by Orientals
30. Free white persons had long been eligible for citizenship. Act
of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. See also Act of July 14, 1870, ch.
254, § 7, 16 Stat. 256 (persons of African nativity or descent eligible).
Statutory amendments further restricted the categories until they eventually became primarily applicable only to Japanese. Act of Oct. 14,
1940, ch. 876, § 303, 54 Stat. 1140 (races indigenous to Western Hemisphere eligible); Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, § 3, 57 Stat. 601 (Chinese
eligible); Act of July 2, 1946, ch. 534, 60 Stat. 416 (Filipinos and Indians
eligible).
31. E.g., an alien could not acquire a leasehold interest, Terrace v.
Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); nor could the alien have the conveyance
made to a citizen, if the consideration was paid by the ineligible alien,
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
32. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb,
263 U.S. 225 (1923).
33. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 219-22 (1923).
34. Id. at 216-18 (citing Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 484,
488 (1880); Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333, 340 (1901); Phillips v.
Moore, 100 U.S. 208, 212 (1879)).
35. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
36. Id. at 647 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring); id. at 650 (Murphy & Rutledge, JJ., concurring).
37. But the Court did strike down similar restrictions in commercial
fishing licenses the same year. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334
U.S. 410 (1948).
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have either repealed or judicially invalidated their laws since the
war. Most important in this regard were California, where the
legislature repealed the act in 1953 and provided compensation
for those whose land had been forfeited in the interim; 88 Oregon, where the state supreme court invalidated the act as violative of constitutional guarantees; 39 and Washington, where provisions of the state constitution were repealed by referendum in
1966.40 Other legislation lost its significance with the 1952
amendment of the federal immigration law, 41 which eliminated
the class of "ineligible aliens. '42 Apparently meaningless rem43
nants of the law remain in a few states.

The third major wave of legislation arose during the "Cold
War." These state statutes actually operated upon probate,
rather than property, law and were designed to prevent the
diversion of American wealth to totalitarian governments, rather
than to prevent land ownership by individual aliens. They
permitted state courts to impound the proceeds of inherited
lands where it appeared that an alien heir would not have the
full and real enjoyment thereof.44 These provisions created a
number of problems for the courts. How should a judge determine whether an alien beneficiary would receive the full and real
enjoyment of his property? A superficial inquiry into the foreign nation's statutes would almost always produce an affirmative answer, and an inquiry directed to the consular or diplo38.

Cal. Stats. 1953, ch. 1816. The act was repealed after the state

supreme court had declared it invalid in Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d
718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
39. Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949). See
also State v. Oakland, 129 Mont. 347, 287 P.2d 39 (1955).
40. WASH. CosT. amend. 42. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 64.16.005
(Supp. 1974) implements this amendment by providing that any alien
may hold, convey, or devise any interest in land as if he were a native
citizen.
41. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 311, 66 Stat. 239
(1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1970) ).
42. There still are some aliens ineligible for citizenship, notably
resident aliens who have claimed exemption from military service pursuant to treaty, 8 U.S.C. § 1426 (1970); 5) U.S.C. APP. § 454(a) (Supp.
IV, 1974), and others who do not meet other criteria for grant of citizenship. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1423-1427 (1970). State laws seem never to have
been applied to any of these classes.
43. Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1201 to -1207 (1974); KAN. REV.
STAT. AxN. § 59-511(19) (inheritance).
44. For an exposition of this legislation and its impact, see Berman,
Soviet Heirs in American Courts, 62 COLum. L. REv. 257 (1962); Heyman,
The Nonresident Alien's Right to Succession Under the "Iron Curtain
Rule," 52 Nw. U.L. REV.221 (1957).
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matic officials of the foreign state could hardly be expected to
produce a negative one. So probate courts entered into a series
of independent inquiries, often contradicting or ignoring foreign
statutes and diplomatic officials.
In Zschernig v. Miller,45 the Supreme Court severely restricted this approach, characterizing the independent inquiries
as an invasion of the federal government's exclusive rights in the
field of foreign relations. It has been widely supposed that the
decision nullified the statutes, but many of them remain on the
books, 40 and some of them have been upheld by state and lower
federal courts willing to distinguish Zschernig on the basis of
47
technical differences in the legislation or its application.
The general tendency for the past quarter century has been
to reduce or eliminate barriers to alien ownership of real estate,
indeed in some cases the laws have been modified to stimulate
foreign investment.48 Other than the Cold War inheritance
legislation, there appear to be only two new state laws increasing
the burdens on alien investors. These laws, adopted by Iowa
and Nebraska in 1975, merely add public reporting require49
ments to those states' existing restrictions on alien ownership.
IL

EXISTING LEGISLATION AFFECTING
ALIEN OWNERSHIP

Land law is principally state law.50 The states, through
reception of the common law or through their own judicial or
statutory innovations, define and delimit the rights of real estate
ownership. The federal law in this field, with two significant
exceptions, is of only peripheral interest. The exceptions concern the property, real and personal, of enemy or hostile aliens.
The Alien Property Custodian Regulations, 1 promulgated under authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 52 provide that
the property of enemy aliens shall vest in a federal official in
45. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
46. See text accompanying notes 108-19 infra.
47. See note 172 infra and accompanying text.
48. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 57-103 (1962), for example, extends permitted
alien landholding to 500,000 acres (in place of the previous 500). This
extension reportedly was made so that a pulp mill could locate within
the state. Sullivan, supra note 6, at 40.
49. Iowa Laws 1975, ch. 133, §§ 7-8; Neb. Laws 1975, LB 203, § 2.
50. See Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 484 (1880); Chirac v.
Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817).
51. 8 C.F.R. pts. 501-10 (1975).
52. 50 U.S.C. App. § 1 et seq. (1970).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:621

time of declared war. The Foreign Assets Control Regulations,5" promulgated under the same statute, subject all property
transactions by aliens of listed nations to prior approval and
clearance from the Treasury Department. Both sets of regulations rest upon the war and foreign relations powers of the
federal government. They are described in greater detail in
connection with their possible preemptive effect upon state
54
law.
Other federal laws deal with a host of land-related questions, generally involving the right to obtain or exploit federally
owned resources, such as homestead land,55 grazing land,50
mineral land,57 or geothermal steam resources. 58 The states
have similar bodies of law dealing with the disposition of their
property.59 Frequently these laws, both state and federal, have
provisions excluding some or all aliens from directly obtaining
public lands or rights. The description and evaluation of these
laws are beyond the scope of this inquiry.
State laws both define the entities that can be "owned" and
provide recognition for ownership. In this sense, state laws
defining property rights are different from those restricting personal liberties. In general, our system allows an individual to do
anything that he is not forbidden to do, but in the sphere of
property relations, he may do only what he is allowed toown, buy, sell, lease, and so on. The law creates property
rights, while it limits freedoms. 60 This seemingly esoteric dis53. 31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1975). Re.ated regulations are the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations, id. pt. 515, and the Rhodesian Sanctions Regulations, id. pt. 530.
54. See text accompanying notes 200-08 infra.
55. 43 U.S.C. § 161 (1970); 43 C.F.R. § 2511.1 (1974).
56. 36 C.F.R. §§ 231.3-6 (1975); :U.S. Forest Service, Manual; §§
2231.14-.18 (1969).
57. 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-26 (1970) (development of certain "valuable
minerals" on public domain land); id. § 181 (leases of public domain
land for development of coal, oil, and similar minerals); id. § 352 (leases
of non-public domain land for all types of minerals); 42 id. § 2061 et
seq. (1970) (special rules for uranium); 43 id. § 1331 (offshore oil
leases). All contain some restraint on alien exploitation.
58. 30 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1970).
59. E.g., Amiz. CONST. art. X, § 11; ALAsKA STAT. § 38.05.190 (1973);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-240 (1974); IDAnO CODE § 58-313 (1976);
ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 273.255, 517.010, 517.044 (1973).
60. Some would find a "natural" or "social contract" right to property that logically precedes the creation of governmental institutions.
E.g., J. LocKE, Two TRExATISES OF GOVEMNMENT bk. II, §§ 25-51, 123-27
(P. Laslett ed. 1960). Even conceding this idea in an inchoate, generalized sense, the fine definitions of property rights must be drawn by the
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tinction has a practical impact, for courts are more willing to
tolerate discrimination by the legislature in the exercise of its
definitional power, e.g., in creating property rights, than in the
exercise of its regulative power, e.g., restraining personal liberty.61 In the first case, but for the legislative enactment, there
would be nothing; in the second case, there would be unfettered
freedom.
The state laws presently affecting foreign ownership of real
estate fall into three major types: (a) those that directly affect
ownership by foreign individuals, (b) those that affect foreign
corporate ownership, and (c) those that affect ownership by foreign individuals through the laws relating to inheritance. In a
majority of states there is no restriction on foreign ownership
of real estate. In all but five, the restrictions are so trivial, or
so easily avoided, as to be meaningless.
A. REsTRIcTIONS oN

AL

IND Iv uALs

The statutes of the dozen states that substantially restrict
ownership of land by alien individuals can be subdivided into
three major categories: (1) those in which the prohibition is
general, (2) those that limit the amount or value of holdings,
and (3) those that limit the time of holding. No two of the
statutes are the same.
Four states, Connecticut, 62 Mississippi, 63 New Hampshire, 64 and Oklahoma,6 5 generally exclude aliens from land
ownership. Three of these states provide an exception for aliens
residing within their own borders; qonnecticut, for aliens residing anywhere in the United States. Two of the states(6 further
state, either by legislation or judicial declaration. Most judicial discus-

sion of this point has focused on the power of states to enact prospective
legislation affecting the obligation of contracts. See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827) (finding the obligation of contracts
to be derived from state law, over Chief Justice Marshall's dissent
grounding the obligation in natural law principles).
61. The Supreme Court pointed out this distinction most clearly in
upholding the anti-alien land laws in 1923. In Terrace v. Thompson, 263
U.S. 197, 221 (1923), the Court distinguished Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33 (1915), in which it had held a restriction on the employment of aliens
unconstitutional, describing land ownership as a "privilege."
62. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-57, -58 (1960).
63. Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-23 (1973).
64. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477.20 (1968).
65. OKLA. CONST. art. 22, § 1; OiI.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 12123 (1971).
66. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-57 (1960) (citizens of France);
MIsS. CODE ANN. § 89-1-23 (1973) (citizens of Syria and Lebanon).
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provide special treatment for the citizens of specified nations, a
provision that is of dubious constitutional validity.6 7 Connecticut allows nonresident spouses or lineal descendants of deceased,
lawful alien holders to take and hold indefinitely, 6s while Oklahoma permits nonresident alien he.rs to hold real estate for five
69
years.
On their faces, these statutes extend to all kinds of real
property-residential, commercial, industrial, or agriculturalexcept the Connecticut rule, which exempts mining property
from its prohibition. 70 In form these are the most far-reaching
of the state restrictions.
Four other states, Iowa, 71 Minesota,7 2 Pennsylvania, 73 and
Wisconsin, 4 have significant acreage restrictions. The Iowa
and Wisconsin laws limit nonresident aliens to 640 acres, a tract

large enough, however, for most nonagricultural and many agricultural uses. Iowa also exempts all land within municipal
boundaries. Minnesota provides a much more restrictive rule,
limiting alien holdings to 90,000 square feet, about two acres, or
the size of a city block. It also provides, however, a series of
exceptions: for aliens applying for citizenship, for aliens who
have acquired by inheritance or corporate distribution, and for
settlers on small farms. 7 5 Pennsylvania provides a broader ex-

ception, exempting alien ownership of land not exceeding 5000
acres in area and not providing more than $20,000 in net annual
67. See text accompanying note 174 infra.
68. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-57 ,'Supp. 1976).
69. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 123 (1971).
70. CONN. GEN. STAT. A iN. § 47-58 (1960).
§ 22.

71. IowA CODE § 567.1 (Supp. 1975).

See also IowA CONST. art. 1,

72. MnDNN. STAT. § 500.22 (1) (1974).
73. PA. STAT. Ax

. tit. 68, § 32 (1965).

74. Wis. STAT. §§ 710.01, .02 (1973).

But cf. WIs. CONST. art. 1, §
15 ("No distinction shall ever be made by law between resident aliens

and citizens, in reference to the possession, enjoyment or descent of property.").
75. Minnesota also expressly provides that the statutory restrictions
do not apply if a treaty grants greater rights to an alien. MA-TN. STAT.
§ 500.22(1) (1974). This is substantively unimportant, since a treaty
would prevail over state law in any event, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1920), but it is significant in procedural and political terms. Procedurally, it means that a challenge to a state statute by a treaty-protected alien is only to its application and not to its basic validity, thus
excluding the possibility of a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. § 2281
(1970). See Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354, 361 (1940). Politically,
it reflects the state legislature's acknowledgement of its limited role in
the disposition Qf the.e issues.
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income. This exception would permit extensive holding of
nonproductive land for investment or development.
In three of these states, then, the impact of the legislation is
almost exclusively on agriculture and related activities. The
exclusion of urban land, either expressly or by maximum-size
limitations, means that most alien investment in residential,
industrial, or commercial property is not affected. Certain other
land-intensive activities, such as mining, housing developments,
and the very largest industrial undertakings, might also be limited. Only Minnesota, with its more restrictive limitation, would
preclude most foreign commercial and industrial developments.
Even there, individual residential and recreational purchases
would not be affected.
Finally, Illinois, 76 Indiana, 77 Kentucky, 78 and Nebraska7 9
put time limits on alien ownership. In general, the limitation
periods range from five to eight years,8 0 but there are exceptional circumstances that will extend the limitation period.8 ' Again,
a substantial number of landholdings are excepted from the
restrictions. Indiana apparently exempts holdings of up to 320
acres, and in Nebraska the time restrictions do not apply to land
within three miles of a city's limits. In all but Nebraska an alien
can take any real property interest, so long as he disposes of it
within the prescribed period; in Nebraska the alien may only
take a leasehold interest not exceeding the statutory period.
These laws have varying impacts on different kinds of real
estate investment. The Nebraska law affects mainly farmland,
but in Nebraska this is a severe restriction. The Indiana and
Nebraska laws appear designed to encourage alien immigrants to
become citizens, since the time restrictions they impose coincide
with the five-year period prescribed by federal law for acquisi8 2 The law in all these states except
tion of citizenship.,
Nebraska could potentially affect all kinds of land investment.
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 6, §§ 1-2 (1975).
77.

IND.CODE § 32-1-8-2 (1973).

78.

K Y. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.300, .330 (1970).

79. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-402, -414 (1971).
80. ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 6 § 2 (1975) (six years); IwD. CODE § 321-8-2 (1973) (five years); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.300, .330 (1970)
(eight years); NED. REV. STAT. § 76-402 (1971) (five years).

81. In Kentucky a resident alien may hold land for a residence,
trade, or business for 21 years, KY. REv. STAT. AwN. § 381.320 (1970),
and special rules apply for the alien spouse or children of a United States
citizen. Id. § 381.310.
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (a) (1970).
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In addition to these 12 states, there is another handful in
which a search of the statutes reveals merely nominal restrictions
on alien ownership. Four states purport to exclude alien enemies from property ownership, 83 a provision that is undoubtedly
preempted by federal legislation. 4 Two others, Arizona8s and
Wyoming,80 retain remnants of the old "eligibility for citizenship" laws, although these are both practically irrelevant and
clearly unconstitutional.8 7 Finally, there is the peculiar provision in South Carolina, which limits each alien to a half million
88
acres of land.
B.

RESTRIcTIONS ON CORPORATIONS

Since the corporate form of operation is now a common
form of business enterprise in this country, restrictions on individual investors will not affect a primary form of alien investment. Moreover, since the corporate form is readily available to
the alien investor; it would be a simple avoidance device if only
individual alien ownership were prohibited. Yet only a few states
substantially restrict land acquisition and holding by such corporations. Two states, Iowa8 9 and Nebraska,90 exclude from most
land ownership corporations in which aliens hold a majority of
stock. In Wisconsin this rule applies if nonresident aliens hold
more than 20 percent of the stock. 91 These laws include a
83. GA. CODE ANN. § 79-303 (1973-; M . ANN. CODE art. 21, § 14101 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3-18 (Supp. 1975) ("alien friends" permitted to hold real estate); VA. CODE Amr. § 55-1 (1974).
84.

See text accompanying notes 200-09 infra.
AIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1201 (1974).
86. Wyo. CoNsT. art. 1, § 29; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-151 (Supp. 1975)
(applies, on its face, only to nonresident ineligible aliens).
87. See text accompanying notes 35.43 supra.
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-103 (1962).
89. IowA CODE §§ 491.67, 567.1, 567.2 (1975).
The statute applies
both to corporations incorporated outside of the United States and to corporations in which half or more of the stock is owned by nonresident
aliens. A new statute requires reporting by alien corporations. Iowa
Laws 1975, ch. 133, § 7.
90. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-402 to -414 (1971).
The prohibition
-applies to a corporation if a majority of its stock is owned by aliens,
if a majority of the directors are aliens, or if its executive officers are
aliens. Id. § 76-406. Moreover, any corporation not incorporated in Nebraska can acquire at most a five-year leasehold interest in Nebraska
real estate lying three miles beyond a city's limits. Id. §§ 76-402, -414.
Furthermore, a new statute requires annual reporting by corporations
that have acquired at least a leasehold interest in agricultural land. Neb.
Laws 1975, LB 203. One of the express purposes of the act is "to protect
against alien ownership of Nebraska agricultural land." Id. § 1.
91. Wis. STAT. § 710.02 (1973).

85.
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variety of narrow exceptions. 92
Two other states, Arizona9 3 and Minnesota, 94 prohibit corporations organized outside of the United States from holding
real estate. The common law of some other states may be
interpreted to extend the rules against individual aliens to such
corporations.9" Further, New York conditions the power of any
out-of-state corporation to hold land upon reciprocity, 96 but the
creation of a New York subsidiary avoids the impact of the
statute. And South Carolina limits alien corporations, like alien
individuals, to 500,000 acres each, 97 a virtually meaningless
limitation. A formal prohibition on corporate ownership by
aliens in Pennsylvania9 8 has been largely eaten away by provisions of the state's corporation code.99
The family farm acts of eight states in the upper Midwest
and Great Plains are also relevant here.01 These laws limit or
prohibit investment in agricultural land by corporations owned
by numerous shareholders or engaged in substantial nonagricultural activities. 10 1 Moreover, because they define agricultural
land' 02 broadly, if at all, these statutes may affect nonagricultural corporate activities also. On the other hand, in only two
states, Minnesota and North Dakota, are the acts drafted in a
92. E.g., in Iowa lenders may hold foreclosed land, IOWA CODE §
567.2 (1975); in Nebraska common carriers, manufacturers, filling stations, and bulk stations are exempt in some (but not all) circumstances,
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-412, -413 (1971); Wisconsin grants a 640-acre exemption. Wis. STAT. § 710.02 (1973).
93. ARm. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-107 (D) (Supp. 1975).
94. MmNN. STAT. § 500.22(1) (1974).

95. See Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464, 489-91 (1823).
96. N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 221 (McKinney 1943).
97. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-103 (1962).
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 21 (1965).
99. Id. tit. 15, § 2203(b) (1) (1967) (repealing as to corporations for
profit); id. § 8103(b) (repealing as to corporations not for profit); id.

§§ 8102, 8103 (g) (repealing as to nonprofit corporations).
100. Iowa Laws 1975, ch. 133; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-5901, -5902

(1974); MNN. STAT. § 500.24 (Supp. 1975); Mo. Acts 1975, act 114; N.D.
§ 10-06-01 (1960); OiKA. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 951-54 (Supp.
1975); S.D. CODE § 47-9A-3 (1974); Wis. STAT. § 182.001 (1973).

CENT. CODE

101.

Most of the statutes grant exemptions to corporations that en-

gage primarily in agriculture and that have a limited number of share-

holders, and to closely held "family farm corporations."
102. When applied, this concept is very broad. E.g., MINN. STAT. §
500.24(2) (Supp. 1975) (prohibiting nonexempt corporations from acquiring an interest in "land used for fanning or capable of being used
for farming"). Statutory exceptions permit industrial development on

agricultural land acquired by corporations, subject to limitations. See,
e.g., id. § 500.24(2) (h).
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manner that would severely inhibit the formation of a personal
holding corporation to circumvent the statutes applying to alien
individuals. 103
The paucity of realistic state restrictions on corporate ownership probably is attributable to the state of corporate law when
the anti-alien restrictions were enacted. Unlike individuals, corporations have only those rights conferred upon them by the
laws of the state in which they are operating, unless they are
engaged in interstate commerce or otherwise exempt from state
jurisdiction. 0 4 Apparently, the legislators responsible for the
current anti-alien restrictions thought that they could limit alien
land ownership through the corporate form by simply excluding
undesired corporations or by denying corporations generally the
power to own lands. However, the states no longer effectively
screen the corporations created under their laws or admitted to
do business within their boundaries. Moreover, corporate purpose clauses have been expanded to permit virtually all legitimate businesses,' 0 5 and corporate land ownership is frequently
expressly authorized. 10 6
C.

EFFECT OF INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE RESTRIcTIONS

When the restrictions on ownership by alien individuals
and corporate ownership are taken together, only five states have
substantial restrictions on alien ownership of land. All five are
in the upper Midwest-Great Plains region: Iowa, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. Iowa and Wisconsin limit both aliens and alien-controlled, corporations to 640 acres.
Minnesota and Oklahoma impose more severe restrictions on
individuals, but limit alien corporations principally through the
provisions of their family farm legislation, thus also leaving
nonagricultural land open to alien corporate investment. Nebraska's is the most complex of these statutes, but it too leaves
alien investment within municipal boundaries and in certain
other areas unregulated.
103. North Dakota has a flat prohibition, N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-01
(1960); Minnesota requires a majority of the shareholders to reside on
the farm or actively engage in farming. MINN. STAT. § 500.24(1) (d)
(Supp. 1975).
104. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wal) 168 (1869); Bank of Augusta
v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
105. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 3 (1974) ("any lawful purpose or purposes, except for the purpose of banking or insurance").
106. See, e.g., id. § 4(d).
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Thus, if the alien investor is free to use either the personal
or corporate form, he may invest in most urban and rural land in
the United States-whether for industrial, commercial, or residential use. The only substantial obstacles he faces are the laws
of five states regarding farmland, or large tracts of any land.
If the alien investor is constrained to use the corporate form
for taking title, he may still invest in urban land anywhere in the
United States, but, because of the operation of the family farm
acts, the list of states in which he cannot buy agricultural land
expands to eight states with the addition of Missouri, North
Dakota, and South Dakota.
If, for tax or other reasons, 10 7 the alien investor is constrained to use a non-American corporate form for taking title,
the list of potential danger areas expands still further and begins,
in Arizona, Minnesota, and, potentially, New York, to affect
urban, as well as agricultural, real estate.
D. REsTRIcTIoNs ON INHEMTANCE
More than a dozen states have restrictions on inheritance of
real estate by aliens. While these restrictions do not directly
affect alien investment, they do restrict one means of alien
acquisition of land. Moreover, they may discourage potential
investors, alien or not, who would wish to be able to devise their
holdings to aliens. Most of the restrictions fall into two
categories: those that depend on a finding that the alien's
nation will deprive him of his inheritance, and those that depend
on a finding that the alien's nation would not permit a United
States citizen to inherit property from one of its citizens.
Five states, Connecticut, 0 8 Massachusetts,'0 9 New Jer110
New York,"' and Wisconsin," 2 condition the probate
sey,
court's order of distribution to a nonresident alien beneficiary on
a demonstration that he will receive the true benefit of the
inheritance. Some of these statutes impose the burden of proof
on the heir. In New York, for instance, if the heir fails to carry
the burden, the assets of the estate are either put into escrow,
paid into some public fund for the possible eventual benefit of
107. See Forry, PlanningInvestments from Abroad in United States
Real Estate, 9 INT'L LAWYER 239 (1975).
108. Con. GER. STAT. ANN. § 45-278 (Supp. 1976).
109. MAss. AnN. LAws ch. 206, § 27B (1969).
110.
111.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:25-10 (1953).
N.Y. SuER. CT. PRo. LAW. § 2218 (3)

112. Wis. STAT.

§

863,37 (1973).

(McKinney Supp. 1975).
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the heir, or, in certain circumstances, converted into the "necessities of life" and sent to the heir abroad. 113 Some of the
statutes, New Jersey's, for instance, are silent on the question of
proof. The New Jersey courts limit themselves to a routine
reading of the foreign statutes in such cases. 114 They do so
apparently to avoid unconstitutionality under Zschernig v.
Miller," 5 the 1968 Supreme Court decision limiting the permissible scope of state judicial inquiries into the treatment of inheritances by foreign states.
These statutes are relics of the more frigid periods of the
Cold War, when certain Eastern European countries virtually
confiscated inheritances by means of taxes and other levies.
Their concentration in the Eastern seaboard resulted from the
high incidence of first-generation Eastern European immigrants
resident there. Their constitutional validity in light of the
Zschernig decision is discussed below.
The second major group of statutory restrictions on inheritance by aliens operates only if Americans are denied the right to
inherit real estate in the alien's home country. These statutes
have roots both in the ancient real property law, which denied
inheritance rights to aliens unless specially granted by treaty or
legislation, and in the treaty practice of the United States, which
has sought to ensure inheritance rights on a reciprocal basis. They
are found in Iowa,'. 6 Nebraska, 1 '7 Wyoming, 118 and North
Carolina." 9 A few other states impose minor restrictions of
20

various types.1

In contrast to these restrictions on inheritance by aliens,
some statutes allow an alien heir a substantial period of time in
which to dispose of property that would otherwise
be held in
121
violation of general restrictions on alien ownership.
N.Y. SuRR. CT. PRo. LAw. § 2218 (3) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
114. In re Kish's Estate, 52 N.J. 454, 246 A.2d 1 (1968).
115. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
116. IowA CODE § 567.8 (1975).
117. NEB. REV. STAT. § 4-107 (1974). In Nebraska general anti-alien
laws also apply, so a resident alien unprotected by treaty rights may
have his real estate inheritance escheated by the state if he does not dispose of it within five years. See id. § 76-L-05 (1971).
118. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 2-43.1 (Supp. 1975).
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 64-3 (1975). Two states have recently repealed similar laws. Cal. Stats. 1974, ch. 425, § 1 (repealing Cal. Stats.,
ch. 1042, § 1); Mont. Laws 1974, ch. 365, § 2 (repealing Mont. Laws 1951,
ch. 31, § 1).
) ("eligibility for citizen120. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-511 (19
ship" test).
121. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.330 (1970) (eight years); NEB. REv.
113.
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III.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND TREATY LIMITATIONS

A variety of constitutional doctrines and international obligations imposed on the United States by both bilateral and
multilateral treaties stand as potential challenges to many of the
above-discussed statutes and to other types of restrictions that
might be imposed on alien land ownership by the federal and
state governments. In many instances particular treaty provisions will protect particular aliens and thus render constitutional
consideration unnecessary. This section considers the various
types of actual and possible legislation in light of the applicable
constitutional and treaty provisions.
A.

EQUAL PROTECTION

Equal protection must stand at the outset of this discussion,
because it binds both federal and state governments 1 22 and
because of its significance in the recent development of protections for individual liberties. 123 The equal protection clause
clearly protects aliens 2 4 as well as citizens. Its application to
aliens, however, has been directed toward resident aliens, not
nonresident investors. For instance, equal protection concerns
mingled with due process considerations in the cases that finally
struck down the anti-Oriental laws in the late 1940's and early
19501s.125
Current equal protection doctrine establishes two levels of
constitutional protection. If a law employs "suspect" classifications or affects fundamental rights, the "higher test" applies
and the state or federal government must show a compelling
public interest to validate the law. 1 26 All other classifications
STAT.

§ 76-405 (1971)

(five years for resident aliens);

OKLA. STAT. tit.

60,-§ 123 (1971) (five years).
122. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Bolling v. Sharpe,

347 U.S. 497 (1954).
123. See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Developments
in the Law-Equal Protection,82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
124. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369
(1886).
125. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Sei Fujii v. State,
38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); State v. Oakland, 129 Mont. 347,
287 P.2d 39 (1955); Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 204 P.2d 569
(1949).
126. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 19294 (1964).
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are judged by a "lower test," which merely requires a rational
relationship between the classification and its intended purpose. 127 Since the higher test is very difficult to satisfy, and the
lower test is very easy to satisfy, the critical question is which test
is applicable.
The Supreme Court has recently included classifications
based on alienage in its list of suspect categories.128 It argued
that aliens are one of those "discrete and insular" minorities
whose rights merit special protection12 0-a proposition hard to
deny, given the formal political impotency of aliens. If alienage
is truly a suspect classification, virtually all of the state anti-alien
laws would fall, since the heavy burden of persuasion placed on
the states could hardly be met by the governmental interests
underlying most restrictions on alien land ownership. An examination of the cases treating alienage as a suspect basis of
classification illustrates, however, that the judicial language has
swept wider than the decisions themselves.
Graham v. Richardson5 0 is the first of these recent cases.
There Arizona and Pennsylvania had denied welfare benefits to
resident aliens on the ground that they were not citizens. In
striking down the statute, Justice Blackmun stated for the Supreme Court: "[T]he Court's decisions have established that
classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality
or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
scrutiny."' 3 ' Thus he propelled the level of scrutiny from the
lower test, which had prevailed in. many of the older decisions, 132 to the higher one. Despite the broad language of this
dictum, it is difficult to conceive of its application to nonresident aliens. Indeed, Justice Blackmun's description of the
facts of the case repeatedly emphasized the permanency of the
127. E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 'U.S. 471, 485 (1970); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-27 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Lindsley v. National Carbolic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
61, 78 (1911).
128. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
129. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citing United
States v. Caroline Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
130. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
131. Id. at 371-72.
132. See Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckenbach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927)
(pool room license); Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923) (land laws);
Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923) (land laws); Porterfield v. Webb,
263 N.S. 225 (1923) (land laws); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197
(1923) (land laws); Patstone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) (game
licenses).
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plaintiffs' residence and their substantial relations to the United
States. 133
Sugarman v. DougaIJ134 is a similar case. A New York
statute excluded all aliens from most civil service positions.
The plaintiffs were resident aliens who had been employed by a
nonprofit corporation operating under the auspices of the Office
of Economic Opportunity (OEO). When OEO functions diminished in the late 1960's, the New York welfare department
took over operation of the corporation. It discharged the employees on the basis of the state law. The state first attempted
to defend the statute on the ground that it ensured loyalty to the
state from employees responsible for the formulation and execution of government policy. Pointing out that the statutory
prohibition did not apply to all policy-making positions, and did
apply to many positions that did not involve policymaking, the
Court concluded that the state's justification did not withstand
close judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause. The
state also argued, on the basis of two earlier Supreme Court
cases, 135 that its law could be justified on the broad ground that
a state may confine public employment to its citizens simply in
order to limit distribution of the state's resources to its members.
The Court rejected this proposition, noting that the "special
public interest" doctrine on which it was based had been
grounded on a distinction between rights and privileges that the
Court had rejected in more recent decisions. 3 6 This rejection
of the right-privilege distinction is significant in the present
context because many of the laws restricting alien land ownership are based on the state's traditional interest in defining the
rights and privileges to real property within its jurisdiction.'3 7
Finally, in In re Griffiths,138 a companion case to Sugarman v. Dougall, the Court held that a Connecticut law excluding
aliens from membership in the state bar denied equal protection.
Again it treated alienage as a suspect classification, but again
plaintiff was a resident. Indeed, she had completed her legal
education in the United States.
133.
134.
135.
U.S. 195
136.
son, 394
(1963).
137.
138.

403 U.S. at 367-76.
413 U.S. 634 (1973).
Helm v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Crane v. New York, 239
(1915).
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Shapiro v. ThompU.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404
See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
413 U.S.717 (1973).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:621

Some courts have sought to justify a distinction between
resident and nonresident aliens in the language of the fourteenth
amendment, which guarantees equal protection only to persons
"within [the] jurisdiction '1 39 of the particular state. They
argue that a nonresident, not being present within the state, is
not subject to its jurisdiction and therefore cannot claim constiSuch logic should fail even in formal
tutional protection. 14
terms, because the alien is in fact being subjected to the jurisdiction by implementation of the prohibition. Moreover, a nonresident alien admitted to the United States on a tourist visa might
personally appear in the adjudicating tribunal and thus subject
himself to the state's jurisdiction in every sense of the word.
The justification must be sought in more fundamental
terms. The rights protected by the higher test in equal protection doctrine have been basic human rights: either protection
from racial and religious discrimination, as in the case of the
suspect classifications, 1 4 1 or protection of first amendment
rights, as in the fundamental freedoms cases. 14 2 Although these
rights may have proprietary elements, they are not primarily
rights of an economic nature. Indeed, the lower-level test is
sometimes imprecisely characterized as a test for economic and
social legislation. 1 43 The statutes that have been struck down as
unconstitutionally discriminating on the basis of alienage adversely affected the ability to survive-through welfare benefits,
employment by the state, and eligibility for a profession-of
persons permanently residing in the United States and for most
purposes indistinguishable from American citizens. Inasmuch
as land ownership seems equally basic to such persons, as applied
to them, state statutes restricting ownership of land are almost
certainly also unconstitutional. Many states have recognized
this by providing full or partial exemptions from their laws for
resident aliens.' 44
But what about the alien investor who is not a resident and
It is
is making an investment purely for economic motives?
139.

140.
1971).
141.
142.
143.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§ 1.

E.g., Shames v. Nebraska, 323 F. Supp. 1321, 1333 (D.Neb.
E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 331 (1972).
E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1970).

144. CoNr. Gr N. STAT. Am. § 47-57 (1960); IowA CONST. art. 1, §
22, IOWA CODE § 567.1 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.320 (1971); MIss.
CoDE Am. § 89-1-23 (1972); N.H. Riv. STAT. ANN. § 477.20 (1968);
OKLA. CoNsT. art. XXII, § 1, OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 122 (1971); WIs.
CONST. art. I, § 15; Wyo. CONsT. art. I, § 29.
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difficult to classify his claims in the same category with a welfare
claimant's bid for medical assistance or a permanent resident's
effort to enter a gainful profession. It is, indeed, difficult to
categorize his claim as one of fundamental concern. Although
he is clearly a member of a minority group, he is not part of an
"isolated minority" meriting special judicial protection, for he,
unlike the permanent resident alien who has abandoned his
homeland, can expect the diplomatic support of his national
government. Thus, despite the broad language in some of the
cases, his claim may be reduced to one judged by the "lower"
constitutional standard. Under this standard, legislation restricting his ownership of land is likely to be upheld against
equal protection. There is clearly a rational relationship between the legislative classification, excluding aliens, and its ostensible immediate purpose, exclusion of alien influence from the
state. Whether this purpose is one that the states may legitimately pursue is a question of substantive due process and of the
exclusivity of the federal foreign relations and commerce powers,
topics that are discussed below.
Equal protection doctrine also applies, at least in an attenuated form, against the federal government.1 45
Thus federal
courts have held unconstitutional discriminations against aliens
in federal civil service regulations' 46 and in disaster loan programs. 14 However, the major federal regulations restricting
property ownership by aliens are much more readily defended
against equal protection attack than are state laws, whether
applied to residents or to nonresidents. Based on the defense
power, the Alien Property Custodian Regulations and the Foreign Assets Control Regulations are selective in their operation.
Unlike state laws that employ wholesale proscriptions of most or
all aliens on the ground that some might present a danger to
local economy or security, the regulations single out citizens of
certain nations for restrictive treatment. They do so both to
protect the interests of the United States from hostile activities
within its borders and to protect the interests of the individual
aliens from potentially more severe state actions.' 48 Transac145. See cases cited in note 122 supra.
146. Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 500 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted, 417 U.S. 944 (1974); Ramos v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n,
376 F. Supp. 361 (D.P.R. 1974) (appeal pending).
147. Ramos v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 376 F. Supp. 361
(D.P.R. 1974) (appeal pending).
148. The latter purpose was not entirely altruistic; in part its moti-
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tions with aliens of listed nationalities are prohibited by the
general rule' 49 but may be exempted by license. 50 While the
details of this system are not, at least in peacetime, wholly free
from constitutional doubt under the due process clause, they
exhibit a close relation between discrimination and statutory
purpose, thus avoiding the over-inclusiveness that characterizes
state laws restricting alien land ownership and renders their
validity under the equal protection clause dubious.'5 1
What, then, is the impact of the equal protection doctrine
on existing and potential legislation? The outlines are clear. It
forbids wholesale discrimination against resident aliens by the
state and federal governments. This pertains equally to the
general prohibitions and restrictions on alien ownership and to
legislation dealing with alien inheritances. Thus, the doctrine is
hardly significant for existing state laws, since many of these
already exempt residents.
The equal protection clause would not appear to be an
obstacle to legislation restricting the rights of the nonresident
foreign investor or of the foreign investment company, whether
chartered here or abroad. A nonresident alien may be unable to
rely upon the higher test if his proprietary interest is not coupled
with some other more fundamental personal right, and he will
have little chance of convincing a court that the restrictions
imposed on him are not rationally related to the purpose of
excluding foreign influence.
B.

SUSTANTIVE DUE PRocEss

Although substantive due process arguments are today generally regarded as the last resort of a doomed cause, they may
vation appears to have been the preservation of a corpus of German
assets for reparations payments or for negotiation purposes.
149. Alien Property Custodian Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 505.1 (1976);
Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1975).

150. 8 C.F.R. § 505.1 (1976); 31 C.F.R. § 500.203(c) (1975). Such
licenses may either be general, id. § 500.801 (a); e.g., id. § 500.507 (a) (all

resident citizens of the United States who are nationals of designated
foreign countries solely because formerly domiciled there licensed as unblocked nationals); see 8 C.F.R. § 501.5(0 (1976); or specific. 31 C.F.R.
§ 500.801(b) (1975); see 8 C.F.R. § 501.50 (1976).
151. The regulations operate by presumptions against all aliens of
a given nationality; the exempting licenses are then a matter of administrative discretion, thus providing the alien with no legal protection.
While this submission to administrative discretion may be of dubious
value in times of international tension, it is, for the alien, far preferable
to flat state rules.
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have a clarifying effect in the present area. Substantive due
process was one of the doctrines state courts relied on in
invalidating anti-Oriental legislation. 152 To satisfy current substantive due process requirements, the state need show only a
rational relationship between the purpose of the law and a legitimate state interest.15 3 The close connection between equal protection and due process is apparent. Equal protection addresses
the legitimacy of the classification; substantive due process addresses the legitimacy of the purpose of the law; in combination,
they address the legitimacy of the purpose of the classification.
There can be no question that the state statutes at issue
here bear a rational relationship to an articulated state interest;
the only question is the legitimacy of that interest. The traditional affirmative answer has been drawn from the definitional
powers of the states in real estate law.154 Under this view, the
purpose may be no more than the need for some system of state
law. Such a reliance on definitional powers can hardly be
considered a satisfactory modem justification for the unequal
exercise of these powers. A state cannot justify a discrimination
against women, for example, merely on the basis that it needs
some provisions in its probate code to determine priority in
appointment of administrators. 155 A discrimination against
aliens must likewise have some more substantial basis than the
mere need for some rule in the particular situation. Nor does a
purely historical justification-that aliens have always been the
subject of such discrimination-suffice.
If such traditional answers to the "purpose" questions are
rejected, one reaches the true purpose of the legislation: to
exclude or restrict alien influence in the local economy. One
thus immediately confronts the federal powers over foreign relations and foreign commerce, and must determine their impact
upon the local legislation. Thus, although modern due process
doctrine provides no real limitation on state legislation, it serves
to compel a clear articulation of the purposes of the laws and
thus to make possible a proper constitutional examination of
them under other applicable tests.
152. E.g., Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 609-10, 204 P.2d

569, 581-82 (1949) (argument mixed with equal protection and supremacy clause objections).
153. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drugs, 414 U.S.
156, 164-67 (1973); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963).
154. Hauensteinv. Lynham, i00 U.S. 483, 484 (1880).

155. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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FOREIGN RELATIONS

Arguments based on the federal foreign relations power
have been directed primarily at the inheritance restriction statutes emanating from the Cold War. They may have a broader
impact, however.
No state may conduct an independent foreign policy. For
the purposes of foreign affairs the United States is, in the eyes of
the Constitution, a single nation, without separate states.15 0
Thus, a state may not enter into independent negotiations or
agreements with other nations about property, probate, or any
other matters. 57 All such international affairs must be carried
on by the federal government.
Is state regulation of the rights of aliens to hold real estate
such an impermissible exercise of power? This depends, in
part, on the perspective from which one looks at the state laws.
Viewed as definitions of property rights, they are statutes of
purely local concern, focusing on the land and the peculiar legal
relationships surrounding it. 15 8 Viewed as measures affecting
aliens, they become of international concern because they focus
not on the land but on relationships, beyond national boundaries.
The Supreme Court has spoken twice on this question in
the past 30 years. In Clark v. Allen,'.59 a decedent who died in
1942 left her property by will to German nationals, cutting off
her heirs-at-law, who were California residents. The parties in
interest to the litigation were the wartime Alien Property Custodian, who succeeded to the rights of the German nationals under
the Trading with the Enemy Act, and the California heirs-atlaw, who claimed that the inheritance of the Germans was
barred by a California statute that required a showing of reciprocal inheritance rights in the foreign country. The Court, speaking through Justice Douglas, held hat part of the property was
subject to disposition under the terms of a treaty between the
United States and Germany. 69 The Court dealt with the prop156. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130
U.S. 581, 606 (1889).

See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
158. They have long been justified on this basis. See Terrace v.
Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 217-18 (1923); Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333,
341-42 (1901).
159. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
160. The real estate was subject to disposition under the treaty in
Clark, while the personal property was not. It is the Court's treatment
of the distribution of the personal property that is of interest here, because that portion of the opinion deals with the relative priority of state
157.
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erty not subject to the treaty provisions in a summary manner, 161
holding that it was not an interference with the foreign relations
power of the federal government for a state to condition inheritance rights on reciprocity. Noting that it had once ruled that it
was not an interference with the foreign relations power for a
state to grant aliens property rights that they had not previously
enjoyed,162 the Court implicitly reasoned that the states could
likewise condition or take away these rights.163 The Court.
recognized that such state laws might have an incidental or
indirect effect in foreign countries, but concluded that this alone
did not cause them to "cross the forbidden line" into the exclu04
sive domain of the federal government.
In Zschernig v. Miller,'0 5 nearly 20 years later, the Court,
again speaking through Justice Douglas, substantially modified
this position. Looking to the fact that in applying an Oregon
statute the courts of that state had cast aspersions upon the
veracity of diplomatic certificates and generally engaged in
searching political inquiries, the Court invalidated the statute as
applied.
Justice Douglas stated that the forbidden inquiries infected
all elements of Oregon's law, which included both reciprocity
provisions' 6" and a provision seeking to ensure the beneficiaries
the true benefit of the inheritance, 67 although only the latter
was technically in issue.
Pointing to a number of cases in
which Oregon courts had acted in an undiplomatic, if not injudicious, manner, 168 he concluded:
It seems inescapable that the type of probate law that
Oregon enforces affects international relations in a persistent
and federal law in this field when no treaty applies, regardless of
whether the property is real or personal.
161. 331 U.S. at 516-17.
162. Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333 (1901).
163. 331 U.S. at 517.
164. Id.
165.

389 U.S. 429 (1968).

166. There were two provisions with respect to reciprocity in the
Oregon law. One conditioned inheritance rights on reciprocity of rights
for American heirs abroad; the other conditioned inheritance on the right
of Americans who inherited abroad to repatriate the proceeds without
restriction. ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 111.070(1) (a), (b) (1957), repealed, Ore.
Laws 1969, ch. 5991 § 305, quoted in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,
430 n.1 (1968).
167. ORE. Rnv. STAT. § 111.070(1) (c) (1957), repeated, Ore. Laws
1969, ch. 591 § 305, quoted in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 430 n.1
(1968).
168. 389 U.S. at 435-37. See also id. at 437-39 n.8.
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and subtle way. The practice of state courts in withholding
remittances to legatees residing in Communist countries or in
preventing them from assigning them is notorious. The several States, of course, have traditionally regulated the descent
and distribution of estates. But those regulations must give
way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign
policy.' 69
Although two Justices would. have overruled or limited
Clark v. Allen,1 0 the majority stopped short of this measure.
Thus the Zschernig case arguably can be limited to its facts.
The state and lower federal courts have seized upon this
limited interpretation of Zschernig as a ground for upholding
statutes similar to Oregon's. Although in two cases they have
invalidated reciprocity statutes on grounds similar to those advanced by Justice Douglas, 171 in a. number of other cases they
have either expressly upheld state statutes by comparing the
probing factual inquiries undertaken by the Oregon courts and
described in the footnotes of the Zschernig opinion with the
restrained reading and application. of foreign law involved in
the cases before them,' 72 or avoided a constitutional ruling because of the procedural posture cf the case.1 73
Nonetheless,
Zschernig has had an effect within the scope of its facts. The
propriety of reciprocity clauses and reality of provisions designed
to ensure enjoyment of inheritances by named beneficiaries are
now judged by more rigorous standards. The courts that have
upheld such laws, however, have generally imposed on state
judges in probate cases a requirement that the examination of
foreign law go no farther than a reading of the statutes.
What, then, is the modern prac;ical impact of the doctrine of
the exclusivity of federal power over foreign relations? Does it
require anything more than judicial restraint in conducting inquiries into alien law? Perhaps so.
169. Id. at 440 (citing Berman, Soviet Heirs in American Courts, 62
CoLum. L. REV. 257 (1962); Chaitkin, The Rights of Residents of Russia
and Its Satellites to Share in Estates of American Decedents, 25 S. CAL.
L. REV. 297 (1952)).
170. 389 U.S. at 441, 443 (Stewart & Brennan, JJ., concurring).
171. Mora v. Matton, 303 F. Supp. 660 (N.D. Ohio 1969); In re
K raemer, 267 Cal. 2d 198, 81 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1969).
172. Shames v. Nebraska, 323 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Neb. 1971), aff'd
mem., 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Bjarsch v. DiFalco, 314 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); Goldstein v. Cox, 299 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 471 (1970); In re Kish's Estate, 52 N.J. 454, 246 A.2d 1
(1968); in re Estate of Leikind, 22 N.Y.2d 346, 239 N.E.2d 550, 292 N.Y.S.
2d 681 (1968); In re Johnston, 190 S.E.2d 879 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).
173. Gordun v. Fall, 287 F. Supp. 725 (D. Mont. 1968).

19763

ALIEN INVESTMENT

First of all, the doctrine undoubtedly invalidates the most
blatant examples of national favoritism present in the statutes.
Mississippi's preference for Syrians and Lebanese, for instance, 17 4 smacks too much of independent foreign policy, albeit
one dictated by reasons long obsolete, to withstand constitutional
challenge. Connecticut's preference for French citizens, 175 on
the other hand, may be redeemed by its historical background;
the federal government requested its enactment. 7 6 These, however, are trivial examples.
Of the more common types of prohibition none seems to
involve the active interference with foreign relations that the
court criticized in Zschernig. They either call for simple exercise
of mechanical rules or for merely a formal inquiry into whether
foreign law operates reciprocally. Even the type most susceptible to challenge, the Cold War inheritance laws, seems to have
survived Zschernigif properly applied.
The foreign relations power may, however, still have an
impact, not in the invalidation of existing law but as a restraint
on potential state legislation. Interest in anti-alien legislation
has been rekindled by an altered international economic situation. So long as foreign investment was perceived as an economic oddity, old laws might have continued in force, but few
legislatures were prepared to waste time on new legislation.
The revival of interest is primarily attributable to the likelihood of substantial Japanese and Arabian investment here.
American economic relationships with Japan and the Arab
countries, as with other countries, are a complex whole capable
of meaningful regulation only at the federal level. The whole
has at least two dimensions. In the first place, it cannot be
geographically fragmented; a local prohibition in one region will
frustrate any effort to negotiate a general solution that might be
more satisfactory nationally. In the second place, it cannot be
174. Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-23 (1972). There is an interesting remedial problem in this connection. If the "special status" is void, other
aliens would probably have no standing to sue; the only potential plaintiffs with an interest in challenging the law would be the next class of
resident heirs, excluding nonresident aliens. In the common situation
there are none, so the resident claimant is the state, but it may be precluded from arguing the substantive invalidity of its own laws.
175. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-57 (1960).
176. See Sullivan, supra note 6, at 19 n.24. The United States undertook an obligation to recommend such laws to the states by a treaty
with France in 1853. Even in this regard, the present validity of such
laws is questionable; the underlying treaty has long been superseded by
other international obligations.
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fragmented by type of investment. Investment in land is obviously not the only type that presents the dangers associated
with foreign investment. Indeed, l.and investment may be the
least dangerous form today. Investment in business enterprises
or mere deposits in banks may present more risks of undue
foreign influence than investment in a fixed and observable asset
like land.
Under these circumstances, insofar as state legislatures take
assumed dangers into account in passing legislation, are they not
treading in the prohibited field of foreign policy? Insofar as
they do not, are they not interfering with the proper exercise of
the foreign policy power by enacting legislation that may have
an ill-considered effect on the foreign relations of the United
States? They can be rescued from this dilemma by leaving the
subject-matter where it more properly lies-with the federal
government. Since state legislatures are fundamentally not well
informed on international trade, on monetary and economic
matters, or on the implications of -their decisions for American
policy, they should not act in this field.
To borrow a test from another field of constitutional law, is
it not enough to invalidate a law that its "purpose or primary
effect" 177 is to exclude one or a few foreign groups from participation in the local economy so that it impairs our relations with
those nations? By this test virtually any new restrictive state
legislation would fall.
D.

FOREIGN Co1VnEcE

The federal powers over interstate and foreign commerce
must also be considered in this context. Although the static
character of real estate traditionally exempted its regulation by
the states from commerce clause limitations, 178 modern economic conditions may bring this view into question. Congress has
enacted federal regulatory legislation for some land transactions,179 and the courts have extended the securities laws to
others.18 0 Such legislation is thus far limited to special aspects
177.

School Dist. of Abington Tovnship v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,

222 (1963) (first amendment establishment clause).

178. See note 158 supra and accompanying text. States could not
discriminate against citizens of other states, because of the privileges and
immunities clause. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
179. Housing and Urban Development Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20
(1970); 24 C.F.R. § 1700 et seq. (1975).
10. SEC v, W.J, Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M, Joiner
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of such transactions and clearly does not preempt the field.
Nevertheless, it illustrates the point that land investment can no
longer be considered a purely local phenomenon subject to the
exclusive control of the state in which the land is located.
The federal commerce power extends over foreign, as well
Indeed, in some respects, foreign
as interstate, commerce.'18
commerce appears to receive greater protection from state regulation than does interstate commerce.' 8 2 Does a state, by discriminating against foreign purchasers of land, discriminate
against foreign commerce? Is this not precisely the kind of
interference with foreign commerce that the commerce clause
was designed to avoid: the division of the economy along state
lines? Two separate responses may be offered to justify state
laws in the face of these challenges.
The first response excludes land ownership from the scope
of "commerce." It finds in regulation of land ownership not a
regulation of commerce, but a definitional exercise of state
power over an inherently local matter. 8 3 It was on this theory
that nineteenth-century litigation focused on the subordinate
question of whether the federal government could even displace
84
these state laws through affirmative use of the treaty power,
rather than on the more fundamental question whether the laws
regulated commerce. Yet, whether one uses Chief Justice Marshall's classic "intercourse"'8 5 test or the more modern justifications for federal legislation, 8 6 it is clear that at least some
aspects of interstate land acquisition are "in commerce" in the
constitutional sense. In the case of alien purchasers, the purchase money comes from out of state, the profits flow out of
state, and the entrepreneur deals from outside of the state.
Are states that seek to insulate their land from alien purchase on firmer bases constitutionally than those that sought to
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). See also SEC, Securities Act of 1933
Release No. 5347 (1973).
181. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, ci 3.
182. See, e.g., Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
183. See note 154 supra and accompanying text.
184. See Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880); Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812).
185. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824): "Com-merce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse.
It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches. .. ."
186. For example, the interstate (or postal) movement of offers,
sales documents, and consideration.
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forbid out-of-staters to buy milk,m grain,L88 or natural gas? 8 9
The nineteenth-century justification of these measures as part of
the inherent or definitional powers of the states cannot claim
support from modern economic reality. If this justification is
set aside, what redeeming features, if any, would render the state
statutes restricting alien land acquisition valid despite their impact on commerce outside the st;ate? 190 Their purpose and
effect is not within the generally redeeming "police power" fields
of safety, health, or general social welfare. 191 Rather, they are
economic measures aimed at controlling the structure of the
local economy by excluding certain competitors.
Although these laws thus appear vulnerable to attack under
the commerce clause, two considerations, one formal and one
practical, may be offered to save them from invalidity. First, the
federal government has negotiated and ratified a number of
treaties in recent years that presume the validity of state legislation excluding alien ownership of real estate and provide for the
orderly disposition of alien inheritances. 192 By so doing, the
federal government seems to have tacitly approved state restrictions in these areas. This approval should be sufficient to
immunize those restrictions from dhallenges that they interfere
with the proper exercise of a federal power. 93
The more practical limitation is that in fields in which state
regulation is traditional the courts have been reluctant to invalidate state legislation solely on the basis of the negative implications of the commerce clause. 94 Thus, even where the subject
of state regulation may be well within the scope of interstate
commerce, federal legislation would be necessary to displace
state law.
187. H.P. Hood &Sons v. DuMond, 36 U.S. 525 (1949).
188. Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922).
189. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (19:11).
190. The argument that such effects are "pre" or "post" interstate
commerce is here put aside. Other than as a convenient rule of thumb,
such notions are no longer part of effective constitutional law. See Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1970).
191. E.g., id. at 143; Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 640 (1951).
192. See treaties cited in note 226 infra.
193. Cf. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891) (inapplicability of commerce clause in light of federal statute).
194. The classic exception is United States v. South Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), but Congress quickly acted to restore state
jurisdiction in the McCarran Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970).
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E. PREEMWPTION AN SUPREMACY
Affirmative federal legislation has an impact on two aspects
of the present subject. One concerns resident aliens, the other is
more general.
Congress has the power under the commerce clause' 95 to
control immigration and the admission of aliens to the United
States. The states may not impose their own "immigration
controls" to exclude aliens whom the federal government chooses to admit. 196 Such aliens are entitled to legal privileges equal
in most respects with those of citizens.19'1 If the states can
exclude them from certain economic activities by either direct
or indirect legislation, such as land laws, the states can in effect
defeat the privilege of free admission that the federal government has granted them. Thus the federal immigration laws can
be coupled with the supremacy clause' 9 8 to provide protection
for the rights of resident aliens. 199
Affirmative federal legislation has long displaced state law
in another important field-trading with enemy and hostile
aliens. Two sets of federal regulations, both stemming from the
Trading with the Enemy Act,200 affect the property rights of
such aliens and displace contrary state legislation. These are the
Alien Property Custodian Regulations 201 and the Foreign Assets
202
Control Regulations.
The Alien Property Custodian Regulations take effect in
time of declared war. They had significant impact during the
Second World War. They permit the Alien Property Custodian
to vest in himself the rights and titles of enemy aliens to property
within the United States. 20 3 Such an act supersedes any contrary disposition under state law because of the supremacy
clause. With the recent trend away from formally declared
195. U.S. CowsT. art. I, § 8, el. 3.
196. Henderson v. Mayor of City of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876).
197. Thus, e.g., they enjoy the right to private employment, Truax
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); to welfare benefits, Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365 (1971); to public employment, Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634 (1973); to admission to the bar, In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973).
198.

U.S. CoNST. art. VI, para. 2.

199. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376-80 (1971).
200. 50 U.S.C. App. § 1 et seq. (1970).
201. 8 C.F.R. pts. 501-10 (1976).
202. 31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1975). See also Cuban Assets Control Regulations, id. pt. 515; Rhodesian Sanctions Regulations, id. pt. 530.
203. See 8 C.F.R. § 504.1 (1976). See also 50 U.S.C. AP. § 6 (1970).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60":621

wars, both these regulations and similar state laws 2 4 are probably without significance.
The Foreign Assets Control Regulations adopt a different
tack. They "freeze" or "block" the assets of citizens or entities
of listed countries. The list can be easily varied by publication
of an amended regulation. 20 5 The effect of the "freezing" or
"blocking" is to prohibit transactions with respect to the property.20 6 In the case of real estate, the nominal owner cannot sell
it. The ability to conduct any business on it or take profits derived from it will also be limited, s~nce the proceeds of transactions may themselves be blocked assets.
Because of their flexibility and broader scope, the latter set
of regulations has had more practical significance in recent
years. As situations of extreme hostility develop, nations can be
added to the proscribed list without a formal declaration of
war.20 7 Yet licenses for specific transactions can be issued
regardless of citizenship. 208 For example, although the regulation formally applies to all Vietnamese citizens, refugees may
nevertheless be exempted from its operation by general or specific license. State laws operating purely on the basis of citizenship lack similar malleability. Moreover, various credit and
contractual rights of the proscribed nations, as well as formal
20 9
property rights, can be attached.
Do these two sets of regulations and their parent act set
forth a sufficiently complete body of legislation to preempt state
legislation in the field? Strangely, this question seems not to
have been explored in any of the recent litigation.
The standards for judging federal preemption of a legislative field are set forth in a line of Supreme Court cases. The
most significant of these, Hines v. Davidowitz, 210 dealt with state
efforts to control alien activity, in that case through a registration requirement. Hines sets forth a three-pronged test: "The
nature of the power exerted by Congress, the object sought to be
attained, and the character of the obligations imposed by the
204. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
205. It presently includes Cambodia, North Korea, North Viet Nam,
South Viet Nam, and the People's Republic of China. 31 C.F.R. §
500.201 (1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 19,202 (May 2, 1975).
206. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.201-.204 (1975).

207. See, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 19,202 (May 2, 1975) (addition of South
Viet Nam and Cambodia by regulation).
208.
209.
210.

See note 150 supra.
See 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (a) (1) (1975).
312 U.S. 52 (1941).
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whether supreme
law, are all important in considering ...
state laws on the
of
enforcement
preclude
federal enactments
''2 1 1
over time, the
modified
Although somewhat
same subj ect.
for judging
touchstones
three elements of this test remain
albeit in a
them,
preemption. Chief Justice Warren echoed
212
(1) Is the
different order, in Pennsylvania v. Nelson:
scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it? (2) Do the federal statutes touch a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system must be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject? (3) Does enforcement of the state statute present a
serious danger of confict with the administration of the federal
program?
Whichever version of the tests is used here, the federal law
in this area would not appear to preempt most state legislation,
notwithstanding the fact that the regulations deal with questions
of foreign affairs and defense, areas in which the presumption of
213
First,
preemption is much stronger than in other fields.
back
dates
although the statutory foundation for the regulations
estate
to the First World War, when state regulation of alien real
ownership was more prevalent than today, Congress has not
expressed nor the courts inferred any intention to displace state
legislation. Indeed, congressional ratification in the intervening
period of a number of treaties that assumed the existence of
ownership is strong
valid state laws restricting alien property 214
intention.
an
such
of
absence
the
of
evidence
Second, the legislation is not so pervasive as to indicate the
wholesale invalidity of state laws. The regulations deal with a
very limited subject-enemy alien property in time of declared
war or extreme hostility. As such they supersede state statutes
21 5
But their silence with regard to
dealing with enemy aliens.
the vast range of other potential alien owners cannot lead to the
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 70.

350 U.S. 497, 502-10 (1956).
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941).

214. See treaties cited in note 226 infra.
215. The Alien Property Custodian Regulations permit the responsible federal official to vest property in himself, while state laws appear
to operate automatically. Thus state interests could attach to the real
property of enemy aliens before the federal government could act. Surprisingly, in World War II the federal law seems to have been applied,
rather than state laws. In any event, a state would have to initiate some
kind of proceeding to escheat property or otherwise divest the previous
owner, giving the federal officer an opportunity to make a vesting order.
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conclusion that Congress intended to grant those others an
untrammeled right to acquire real estate.
Third, there seems to be little problem in meshing federal
and state enforcement. The federal regulations provide for
vesting title to alien-held assets in a federal official and for
prohibiting unlicensed transactions.
'State laws limiting real
estate ownership cannot interfere with these purposes. If the
alien owns property, one regulation acts to vest it in a federal
official (and thus exempt it from further state legislative effects) and another serves to prevent the alien from conveying it
to anyone else, including the state! The only questions that
2
arise are of the ipso instante variety, as in Clark v. Allen.

16

If

alien heirs are wholly barred from ownership by state law, then
they never have a vested interest for the Alien Property Custodian to take over or for the Treasury to "block." If they take,
however briefly, then the federal law will apply, precluding
application of the restrictive state provisions. Since the purpose
of the Alien Property Custodian Regulations is, at least in part,
to preserve the assets for possible post-war restitution or other
disposition, the federal claim seems to have priority.
Thus, preemption appears to operate only with regard to
resident and enemy aliens. Otherwise federal law is not so
pervasive as to exclude state legislation.
F.

TREATY OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

The treaty obligations of the United States affect both
federal and state law. Under the Constitution, treaties are a
part of the "supreme law of the land" 217 and thus override
inconsistent state legislation. 218 Many states expressly recognize
this limitation in their statutes 219 or judicial decisions 220 by
purporting to provide rules only for cases not governed by
treaty. Even without such express limitations, treaties will invalidate conflicting state laws.
Treaties do not bind the federal government in the same
sense. A treaty creates an obligation of the United States under
international law, but it does not create a total constitutional
impediment to further national legislation. The President may
216. 331 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1947).
217. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2.
218. In this field the classic case is Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S.
483 (1880).
219. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 500.22(1) (1974).
220. E.g., Erickson v.Carlson, 95 Neb.182, 145 N.W.352 (1914).
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terminate many treaties in accordance with their terms, or negotiate their elimination with other nations. The United States can
also repudiate a binding treaty, although this constitutes a
breach of international law for which the United States is internationally responsible. While Congress does not have direct,
formal power to terminate a treaty, the courts regard subsequent
inconsistent legislation as implicitly repealing the domestic legal
effect of a treaty. 21 Since such a situation would normally
constitute a breach of international law, the courts will attempt
to construe the legislation to avoid such a breach. Thus if
Congress enacted legislation inconsistent with United States treaty obligations to certain countries, the courts would normally
construe such legislation as applying only to citizens of other
countries and would require express language or clear implication before finding a breach of an international obligation. 22 2
The relevant treaty obligations fall into two major categories. Of greatest significance in specifically conferring rights on
aliens are the many bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce,
and navigation. These are in effect with most of the major
investing nations. They have clear and precise provisions relating to land ownership and related rights. In contrast, the
obligations arising under multilateral agreements, especially
those under the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), tend to be more general, reflecting governmental principles rather than the specific rights of aliens.
The United States currently is a party to approximately 223
40 bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation. 22
The treaties cover a variety of problems, from the rights of ships
of each country to enter the other's harbors to the rights of
consuls to visit their imprisoned fellow citizens. In general, they
tend to regulate private and commercial rights rather than political matters. Their provisions regarding land ownership rights,
though clear and precise, are only incidental.
These bilateral treaties fall into two major groups.
Those
negotiated before World War II tend to be selective, apparently
221. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957); Moser v. United States,
341 U.S. 41, 45 (1951).
222. Cf. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933); Chew Heong
v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
223. The State Department lists 43 such treaties, but some are of
questionable practical applicability, e.g., the treaties with Latvia or South
Viet Nam.
224. For a general discussion of their provisions, see Note, The Rising
Tide of Reverse Flow, 72 Mcm L. REv. 551, 568-77 (1974).
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covering only those issues that had generated difficulty between
the parties. 225 The bilateral treaties negotiated since that
time 226 tend to be more comprehensive. They tend to deal
225. These fall into two subgroups: a series of treaties with Latin
American republics negotiated in the mid-nineteenth century, and other
treaties. The Latin American treaties are: Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Argentina, July 27, 1853, 10 Stat. 1005, T.S.
No. 4; Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commnerce and Navigation with Bolivia, May 13, 1858, 12 Stat. 1003, T.S. No. 32; Treaty of Peace, Amity,
Navigation and Commerce with New Granada (Columbia), Dec. 12, 1846,
9 Stat. 881, T.S. No. 54; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
with Costa Rica, July 10, 1851, 10 Stat. 916, T.S. No. 62; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Paraguay, Feb. 4, 1859, 12 Stat.
1091, T.S. No. 272. Honduras was added to this group in 1927. Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Honduras, Dec. 7,
1927, 45 Stat. 2618, T.S. No. 764.
The other pre-1945 treaties still in force are: Treaty of Peace,
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Borneo, June 23, 1850, 10
Stat. 909, T.S. No. 33; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Iran,
Dec. 3, 1938, 54 Stat. 1790, T.S. No. 960; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Consular Rights with Latvia, April. 20, 1928, 45 Stat. 2641, T.S. No.
765; Treaty of Commerce, Friendship and Navigation with Liberia, Aug.
8, 1938, 54 Stat. 1739, T.S. No. 956; Treaty of Peace and Friendship with
Morocco, June 28, 1786, 8 Stat. 100, T.S. No. 224-1; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Consular Rights with Norway, June 5, 1928, 47 Stat. 2135,
T.S. No. 852; Treaty of General Relations with Saudi Arabia, Nov. 7, 1933,
48 Stat. 1826, E.A.S. No. 53; Treaty of Friendship and General Relations
with Spain, July 3, 1902, 33 Stat. 2105, T.S. No. 422; Treaty on Consuls
with Sweden, June 1, 1910, 37 Stat. 1479, T.S. No. 557; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, Establishments, and Surrender of Criminals with Switzerland, Nov. 25, 1850, 11 Stat. 587, T.S. No. 353, 1763 (subsequently
amended); Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Turkey, Oct. 1,
1929, 46 Stat. 2743, T.S. No. 813; Treaty of Commerce with Serbia (Yugoslavia), Oct. 14, 1881, 22 Stat. 963, T.S. No. 319; Treaty of Commerce with
Great Britain, July 3, 1815, 8 Stat. 228, T.S. No. 110; Treaty with Great
Britain on Tenure and Disposition of Real and Personal Property, Mar.
2, 1899, 31 Stat. 1939, T.S. No. 146. Parts of the treaties with Great Britain are specifically applicable to Australia and New Zealand, Supplementary Treaty with Great Britain on Tenure and Disposition of Property, May 27, 1936, 55 Stat. 1101, T.S. No. 964; and Canada. Accession
of Canada to the Convention of Mar. 2, 1899, Oct. 21, 1921, 42 Stat. 2147,
T.S. No. 663.
226. Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation with Belgium, Feb. 21, 1961, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432; Treaty of
Friendship, Navigation and Commerce with Denmark, Oct. 1, 1951, [1961]
1 U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 4797; Treaty of Utilization of Defense Installations with Empire of Ethiopia, May 22, .953, [1954] 1 U.S.T. 749, T.I.A.S.
No. 2964; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with
Finland, Dec. 4, 1952, [1953] 2 U.S.T. 2047, T.I.A.S. No. 2861; Convention
of Establishment with France, Nov. 25, 1959, [1960] 2 U.S.T. 2398, T.I.A.S.
No. 4625; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Federal
Republic of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, [1.956] 2 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No.
3593; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Greece, Aug.
31, 1951, [1954] 2 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057; Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights with Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, [1957]
1 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
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systematically with the same list of problems, in essentially the
same manner, and sometimes in the same language.
The treaties do not have a generic effect on state law. In'
order to rely on one of them, an individual must be able to show
that it applies to him, i.e., that he is a citizen of the relevant
country, that the treaty has been duly ratified, and that it has
become part of the internal law of the United States. Thus one
cannot say that a state statutory provision is wholly void as a
result of a particular treaty, but only that it is inapplicable to
certain aliens. However, since the more recent group of treaties
has a core of common provisions, the effect of multiplying
individual inapplicabilities may be to deprive a state law of any
but nuisance value.
In general, the more recent treaties permit aliens to engage
in a wide range of commercial and industrial activities within the
United States, subject only to the same restrictions that apply to
citizens of the United States.2 27 In return, American citizens
receive these same rights abroad. The formulation of these
activities is exceptionally broad. The treaties commonly contain
provisions guaranteeing rights in all commercial, industrial, financial, and other business activities. Moreover, the treaties are
liberal in terms of the forms of business enterprise permitted.
Navigation with Ireland, Jan. 21, 1950, [1950] 1 U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S. No.
2155; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Israel, Aug.
23, 1951, [1954] 1 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation with Italy, Feb. 2, 1948, 63 Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S.
No. 1965; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Japan,
April 2, 1953, [1953] 2 U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 2863; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Republic of Korea, Nov. 28, 1956,
[1957] 2 U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3947; Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation with Luxembourg, Feb. 23, 1962, [1963] 1 U.S.T.
251, T.I.A.S. No. 5306; Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights with Muscat and Oman, Dec. 20, 1958, [1960] 2 U.S.T. 1835,
T.I.A.S. No. 4530; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with
the Netherlands, Mar. 27, 1956, [1957] 2 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942;
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Nicaragua, Jan.
21, 1956, [1958] 1 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No. 4024; Treaty of Friendship and
Commerce with Pakistan, Nov. 12, 1959, [1961] 1 U.S.T. 110, T.I.A.S. No.
4683; Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations with Thailand, May 29,
1966, [1968] 5 U.S.T. 5843, T.I.A.S. No. 6540; Treaty of Amity and
Economic Relations with Togo, Feb. 8, 1966, [1967] 1 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S.
No. 6193; Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations with Vietnam, April
3, 1961, [1961] 2 U.S.T. 1703, T.I.A.S. No. 4890. Of these, the treaties
with Ethiopia and Iran least conform to the pattern set by the others.
227. Take, as an example, the provisions of only one of these treaties,
that with the Netherlands. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Netherlands, March 27, 1956, art. VII, para. 1, [1957] 2
U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942.
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Aliens are frequently entitled not only to act in their own names
and in the names of corporations organized in their home na228
tions, but also to form local corporations.

In addition to granting rights to conduct business, these
treaties commonly confer expressly the right to acquire land
necessary for the operation of permitted businesses. 229 In some
instances, these rights are limited to the acquisition of leasehold
interests. Even where not so limited, however, these rights
should not be taken to guarantee absolute rights to own real
estate. There are both express and. implicit limitations in most
of the treaties. Most of them expressly reserve to the United
States the right to limit or exclude alien activity in the exploitation of land and natural resources,2 0 This reservation, if exercised, could apparently prohibit aliens from engaging in agriculture, mineral resource development, and real estate speculation
and development. The treaties often expressly recognize state
land law,231 but, on the other hand, the modern ones generally
protect the inheritance rights of aliens. If state law prohibits
alien ownership, the treaties commonly guarantee a treaty-alien
a specified period, usually three to five years, in which to dispose
of inherited property. 232 This protection is a double-edged
sword, for although it ameliorates the confiscatory effect of state
escheat laws, it also implicitly recognizes the general permissibility of state restrictions on alien la.d ownership. The repeated
renegotiation of these treaties as of late and their consistent
ratification by the Senate may be taken as further indication of
federal acquiesence in such restrictions, and perhaps as negating
any general argument that the treaties preempt state law.
One further feature of these treaties deserves note. Many
of them contain "most favored nation" clauses that guarantee
citizens of the relevant nation the most favorable treatment
afforded any alien in the United States.23 3 To take only one
currently relevant example, the treaty with Saudi Arabia, a
"temporary" executive agreement executed in 1933, has such a
provision. 23 4 So Saudi Arabians can claim equal treatment with
Danes, who are entitled to form American companies to exploit
228. E.g., id.
229. E.g., id. art. IX, para. 1.
230. E.g., id. art. VII, para. 2. Restrictions may also be imposed in
other enumerated cases.
231. E.g., id. art. IX, para. 1 (b).
232.

E.g., id. para. 4.

233. For the far-reaching potential of such provisions, see Note, supra
note 224, at 589.
234. Treaty of General Relations with Saudi Arabia, Nov. 7, 1933,
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mineral resources,233 or with citizens of Argentina, who are
by virtue of a provision in the 1853 treaty
entitled to hold land
23 6
with that nation.

The older bilateral treaties are more specific in their provisions and more limited in their scope. They normally focus on
the inheritance problem, which apparently was a persistent issue
in the early part of this century. Many of them go no farther.
Although it must be emphasized that treaty rights depend
upon particular provisions, the broad impact of the bilateral
treaties can be summarized. They legitimate most alien ownership of urban land-industrial, commercial, and residentialbut they do not generally extend to ownership of land for
agricultural development or for exploitation of natural resources.
Their impact on state legislation restricting land ownership by
alien individuals and corporations is thus limited. They preclude operation of state statutes in most urban situations, which
the statutes commonly except anyway, but do not limit their
effect on agricultural or other rural land. The treaties also
generally legitimate state anti-alien inheritance laws applicable
to treaty-aliens, but at the same time mitigate them by eliminating their most severe consequences.
The multilateral agreements entered into by the United
States have more of an impact on the general articulation of
public policy and on proposed or future legislation than on
existing statutes. Although an intermediate state appellate court
once held that the United Nations Charter invalidated a state
anti-alien statute, 237 its decision on this point was later reversed. 238 There seems to be nothing in the Charter that prohibits preferences based on nationality.
The only significant multilateral agreement dealing with
foreign investment is the Code for the Liberalisationof Capital
art. II, 48 Stat. 1826, E.A.S. 53. Indeed, there is little else in this execu-

tive agreement.

235. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Denmark,
Oct. 1, 1951, art. VII, para. 1, [1951] 1 U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 4797.
236. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Argentine Republic, July 27, 1853, art. IX, 10 Stat. 1005, T.S. No. 5. This
provides that citizens of Argentina shall enjoy rights as native citizens
in the acquisition of "property of every sort and determination," and thus
apparently confers upon them the right to hold real estate.
237. See Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
App. 1950).
238. Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 720-25, 242 P.2d 617, 619-22
(1952). The state supreme court invalidated the statute on fourteenth
amendment grounds.
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Movements of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development. 239 The organization itself was created by a multilateral international agreement, 240 which the United States accepted by executive agreement. The Capital Movements Code,
which reflects only one aspect of the organization's work, was
adopted by a decision of the OECD's governing body, in which
the United States concurred.
The Code deals with all forms of capital movement, including investments in real estate. Its aim is the progressive elimination of all barriers to capital movement 24 1 but its impact on real
estate law is minimal. In the first -place, state laws are expressly
excepted from the operation of the Code,242 although the federal
government undertakes to attempt to persuade (but not to compel) states to conform to its dictates. Thus the Code has no
direct legal effect on present state legislation and only a quasipolitical effect on potential state action. Indeed, the exception
for state legislation is further evidence of federal acquiescence in
state anti-alien legislation.
The Code seeks to prevent participant nations from imposing new restrictions on capital movements. 243 There is, however, a provision that might, at least formally, permit such
restrictions on land investment Dr development. The Code
subdivides capital movement into two categories. A participant
country could exclude the operation of the Code as to the
transactions contained in List A oily by making a reservation at
the time of committing itself to adherence to the Code. A
country can exclude application of' the Code to transactions in
List B by making a new reservation at any time.2 44 The sale of

land is included in List A, but the purchase or development of
land is included in List B. Thus, technically, the United States
could, at any time, make an additional reservation to the Code
operation,
excluding land purchase and development from its
245
and then impose controls on foreign land ownership.
239.

ORGANISATION FOR EcoNoAIc COOPERATION AND DEVELOPmENT,

(1969 ed.).
240. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

CODE OF LIBERALISATIoN OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS

Development, Dec. 14, 1960, [1961] 2 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891.
241.

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,

supra note 239, art. 1 (a).
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. annex C.
Id. art. 1 (e).
Id. art. 2(b), annex A.
Controls may also be imposed during economic crises. Id. art.
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Such formal legal logic, however, runs contrary to the
entire purpose of the Code and the OECD. While such a new
reservation would not breach formal international law, it would
certainly impair both the atmosphere of economic cooperation
among participant nations and the bargaining position of the
United States, which has consistently sought to improve, rather
than restrict, opportunities for its investment abroad. Furthermore, the Code itself, while permitting such reservations, places
a variety of inhibitions on their exercise, including periodic
review by the governing body of the OECD and a political
obligation to seek to reduce or remove the barriers as soon as
possible. 2 46 Thus, while the Code would not create any legal
barriers to the adoption of new federal regulations restricting
alien land ownership, it would constitute a serious political
obstacle.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Current state and federal legislation restricting alien ownership of real estate and the limitations imposed on such legislation
by constitutional doctrine and international treaties and agreements present a confusing picture. Concrete conclusions can be
reached only in the context of individual cases, because the
precise effect of the law in question, the scope of constitutional
protection, and the applicability of international limitations will
depend on the facts of each case. Nevertheless, general conclusions about the validity and effectiveness of present laws and of
proposals for new legislation can be drawn.

A. EXISTING STATE LAW
There is little in present state law that effectively and
validly excludes foreign investment in real estate. The bark of
state regulation is much worse than its bite. Except with regard
to agricultural land, present laws prohibiting alien ownership of
real estate have little more than nuisance value. They contain
traps for the unwary and for those least able to protect themselves, but they present little impediment to serious foreign investors.
First of all, because of either their terms or constitutional
limitations, they do not exclude resident aliens from property
ownership. 24 7 Second, by their own terms or because of treaty
246.
247.

Id. arts. 1, 12.
See text accompanying notes 122-51, 195-99 supra.
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limitation, they do not commonly apply to urban, commercial,
industrial, or residential real estate. 248 Most of them exempt
such property; if they do not, treaty rights will protect many
aliens from their enforcement. Thus their impact is primarily in
the land-intensive agricultural and natural resources fields.
Third, most of the statutes are easily avoided by well-recognized
conveyancing devices, especially the use of an insulating corporation or other business entity.249 An investor with competent
legal advice can thus avoid the statutory language and usually
accomplish his objectives. Fourth, even where state law appears
to present an insuperable obstacle to investment, the largest
foreign investors are frequently able to obtain legislative exemption from the operation of the laws.250 The promise of increased local employment and productivity is difficult for any
legislature to resist.
It is apparent, then, that although the laws are not a serious
obstacle to foreign investment, they do contain pitfalls for the
uninitiated and the powerless. The small investor is likely to be
at a disadvantage as compared to the large, the alien from a
nation with a favorable treaty relationship with the United States
is at an advantage as compared to those from other countries,
and the uncounseled alien is at a disadvantage as compared to the
alien with adequate legal counsel. The obscurity of the legislation
probably aggravates this last problem. For instance, a resident
alien who rents his residence and returns to the nation of his
citizenship for a substantial period might unknowingly lose his
residence status and place his ownership rights in jeopardy.
In these respects the most oppressive of the various types of
state laws are those relating to inheritance. It is no accident that
the reported cases in this area involve Syrians, Lebanese, and
East Europeans, not English, French, or Dutch. 251 The more
affluent nations have negotiated treaties protecting the inheritance rights of their citizens on a reciprocal basis. Aliens of
other countries are left at the mercy of distant courts administering a strange law. The wealthy and informed individual, even
from these countries, can avoid the impact of the inheritance
laws by careful estate planning. Only the alien heirs of the less
248. E.g., statutes cited in notes 71-73 supra; see text accompanying
notes 228-29 supra.
249. See text accompanying notes 89-106 supra.
250.

Sullivan, supra note 6, at 38.

251. See case. cited in note 172 supra.
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astute, or the less well advised, suffer the consequences of the
law.
Constitutional limitations only nibble at the edges of this
body of state law, invalidating restrictions on resident aliens,
enemy aliens, and the selective foreign policy of a few states.2 52
Treaty law further limits the impact of state law,253 but again

leaves the core intact. Although there is a potential for further
judicial development of constitutional limitations, the peculiar
history that has made real estate law a special matter for state
legislation is probably too strong to be wholly overturned by
general constitutional arguments.
B. PREsENT FEDERAl, LEGISLATION
The principal federal legislation does not deal with the
same matters as do the state laws. Its foundation is the control
of enemy and hostile alien assets in order to further the defense
and foreign relations interests of the United States. It is far
more flexible than state law, for the federal government, unlike
the states, can and does designate the citizens of specified
nations for adverse treatment under these laws. The federal
regulations are also far more flexible in providing for administrative mitigation of the formal requirements in appropriate
cases.

25 4

Other federal legislation, especially that dealing with the
disposition of federal land through sale or lease, presents as
complicated a picture as state law.255 Many of these provisions
are subject to inhibitions similar to those affecting state law,
especially equal protection limitations and the problem of avoidance through use of corporate devices.
C. PoTENiAL STATE LEGISLATION
The same constitutional and practical limitations that
impede the effectiveness of present state laws on alien real estate
investment would also cripple most potential state legislation.
Such legislation holds little promise of genuine control of foreign
investment in real estate, except in the field of agriculture.
Any new laws would have to be carefully drawn in light
of the limitations discussed above. They cannot apply to residents,
252.
253.
254.
255.

See
See
See
See

text
text
text
text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes
notes
notes
notes

122-51, 174, 195-216 supra.
217-46 supra.
52-54, 203-09 supra.
55-58 supra.
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nor can they apply to many investments-by nonresident aliens
who enjoy certain treaty protections. This excludes state control
of residential, commercial, or industrial land ownership by most
aliens. To apply restrictions only to aliens not protected by treaty
rights would serve little purpose, since these are not generally the
potential investors. Thus the sole range of significant impact
would be the ownership of agricultural land and natural resources.
Of these latter possibilities, restrictions on ownership of
agricultural land would be the most easily defensible. Like the
anti-alien laws of the 1880's and the present corporate farming
laws of some states, such restrictions, presently in effect in some
states, might be viewed as part of a pattern of protection for an
existing social structure. 256 Although they thus partake of state
economic protectionism and isolationism and might be considered burdens on commerce, they possess arguably redeeming
features in their attempt to stabilize social conditions in rural
communities.
Restrictions in the natural resources field would be more
difficult to defend. Whether mining or oil land is owned by
British Petroleum or Texaco has little impact on the health,
welfare, safety, or social conditions prevailing in nearby communities. The Supreme Court's resistance to state legislation
aimed -merely at retaining the state's resources for itself 257 should
apply equally to legislation aimed at prohibiting one class of
outsiders from developing a state's resources.
Moreover, state restrictions on natural resource development by aliens would probably affect both foreign relations and
foreign commerce. Their impact would fall principally upon
investors in a few foreign nations that presently have substantial
monetary surpluses available for investment. Insofar as the
action of some states increased the concentration of these dollar
deposits in other states, it might contribute to a national problem
rather than solve a local one. State restrictions might also make
meaningful national agreements between the United States and
these surplus-laden nations more difficult to negotiate.
The ancient power of states to define property rights may
be strong enough to uphold the generally ineffective present
256. On this point see my forthcoming article on corporate farming
legislation in the University of Toledo Law Review, summer 1976.
257. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West
v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
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restrictions on alien land ownership, but it is a slender reed upon
which to rest a substantial new system of restrictions. Such
power is not beyond limitation by other constitutional doctrines.
To rest the jurisdiction of a state solely on the ground that "it
has always been done that way before" may not suffice if new
national burdens are created thereby. Yet to rest the same
jurisdiction on a more candid basis, dislike or fear of aliens,
invites constitutional invalidity. There is little scope for new
state legislation in this field.
D.

PoTENTIAL FEDERAL LEGISLATION

Adoption of new federal legislation is more a question of
domestic and international desirability than one of legal limitation. Some constitutional limits, most significantly the equal
protection of resident aliens, do apply. The fact that land law
has historically been state law would be no impediment to the
adoption of federal law; despite the definitional character of
state law, a valid federal law would override it. Nor shouldthere be any question that regulation of foreign assets is within
federal competence as an implementation of the foreign commerce power.
58
The most significant legal questions are international.
Long-standing national policy has favored freedom of foreign
investment in the United States. A change in our own laws in
this regard would mean a change in our international political
stance. While the change might be technically justifiable in the
light of the escape clauses of OECD rules, it would seriously
undermine the main thrust of that organization. Moreover, the
treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation contain signifUnless the United
icant exceptions for certain foreigners.
States is prepared to repudiate or restrict these exceptions, any
new legislation will have only a limited impact.
If new rules are to be adopted, federal law is preferable to
state law as the means. Only the federal government has sufficiently comprehensive authority to regulate the whole range of
foreign investments: bank deposits, portfolio investments, direct investments, and land investments. Individual state efforts
would inevitably lead to avoidance mechanisms, which would
defeat the purpose of the law, or to diversion of foreign investment to other states or other sectors, which would simply com258. See text accompanying notes 217-46 supra.
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pound the problem there. Only the federal government has
authority to deal with the problem in sufficient breadth to
effectively control nominee holdings and out-of-state corporations. Moreover, if new federal law is to be adopted, it should
not single out real estate for special treatment, but deal with all
foreign investment in a comprehensive way. Land has no particular quality that requires separate treatment.
The political and economic desirability of such legislation is
beyond the scope of this Article. Studies currently underway
are seeking to determine the extent of foreign investment in the
United States. 259 So long as such investment does not obtain a
dominant position in critical industdes or otherwise constitute a
threat to the nation,, the need for new legislation is doubtful.
Alien-owned businesses are subject to substantive regulation in
the same manner as American businesses. Alien ownership of
major industries has not impeded the United States from taking
effective measures for its own protection in time of war; 60 far
less should the mere fact of alien investment prevent sensible
substantive policy in time of peace.
E.

SuMMARY

State law does not, and cannot, have a major effect on
foreign investment in real estate in the United States, except
possibly in agricultural land. Even there, its impact is minor.
Federal law has not attempted to restrict alien land ownership in
any comprehensive way. While constitutional and practical
arguments indicate that any new restrictions should be imposed
by federal rather than state governments, the necessity or desirability of such new legislation has not yet been demonstrated.

259. Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1450. The studies are being conducted by the Commerce and Treasury Departments and

will be submitted in May, 1976.
260. Alleged German ownership of General Analine permitted the
Alien Property Custodian to take it over and operate it during World

War H.

